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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA DEPUTY 
WALTER J. NALLY et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants# 
v. 
GRACE COMMUNITY CHURCH OF THE 
VALLEY et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
S002882 
(Ct. of Appeal 
No. B015721) 
(Super. Ct. 
No. NCC18668B) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 1, 1979, 24-year-old Kenneth Nally 
(hereafter Nally) committed suicide by shooting himself in the 
head with a shotgun. His parents (hereafter plaintiffs) filed 
a wrongful death action against Grace Community Church of the 
Valley (hereafter Church), a Protestant Christian congregation 
located in Sun Valley, California, and four Church pastors: 
MacArthur, Thomson, Cory and Rea (hereafter collectively 
referred to as defendants), alleging •'clergyman malpractice," 
i.e., negligence and outrageous conduct in failing to prevent 
the suicide. (See Code Civ. Proc, § 377.) Nally, a member 
of the Church since 1974, had participated in defendants1 
pastoral counseling programs prior to his death. 
SEE CONCURRING OPINION 
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This case was previously before us in 1984 after the 
Court of Appeal reversed summary judgment for defendants and 
remanded to the trial court (hereafter Nally I). After we 
denied a hearing and depublished the Nally I Court of Appeal 
opinion, the matter was sent back to the trial court. At the 
close of plaintiffs* evidence at the trial on remand, the 
court granted defendants1 motion for nonsuit on all counts on 
the basis of insufficiency of the evidence.-^ 
The Court of Appeal again reversed and we granted 
review to address: (i) whether we should impose a duty on 
defendants and other "nontherapist counselors" (i.e., persons 
other than licensed psychotherapists, who counsel others 
concerning their emotional and spiritual problems) to refer 
persons to licensed mental health professionals once suicide 
becomes a foreseeable risk, and (ii) whether the evidence 
presented at trial supports plaintiffs* cause of action for 
wrongful death based on defendants* alleged "intentional 
infliction of emotional distress" on Nally. 
•1' Code of Civil Procedure section 581c provides in relevant 
part: "(a) After the plaintiff has completed his or her 
opening statement, or the presentation of his or her evidence 
in a trial by jury, the defendant, without waiving his right 
to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may 
move for a judgment of nonsuit. . . . [If] (c) If the motion 
is granted, unless the court in its order for judgment 
otherwise specifies, the judgment of nonsuit operates as an 
adjudication upon the merits." 
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II. FACTS 
A. Background 
In 1973, while attending University of California at 
Los Angeles (hereafter UCLA), Nally became depressed after 
breaking up with his girlfriend. He often talked about the 
absurdity of life, the problems he had with women and his 
family, and he occasionally mentioned suicide to his friends. 
Though Nally had been raised in a Roman Catholic household, he 
converted to Protestantism while he was a student at UCLA, and 
in 1974 he began attending the Church, the largest Protestant 
church in Los Angeles County. Nally*s conversion became a 
source of controversy between him and his family. During this 
time, Nally developed a close friendship with defendant Pastor 
Cory, who was responsible for overseeing the ministry to the 
collegians attending the Church. On occasion, Nally discussed 
his problems with Cory, but the two never established a formal 
counseling relationship. Between 1974 and 1979, Nally was 
active in defendants1 various Church programs and ministries. 
Defendants offered pastoral counseling to church 
members in matters of faith, doctrine and the application of 
Christian principles. During 1979, defendant Church had 
approximately 30 counselors on its staff, serving a 
congregation of more than 10,000 persons. Defendants taught 
that the Bible is the fundamental Word of God containing 
truths that must govern Christians in their relationship with 
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God and the world at large, and in their own personal lives. 
Defendant Church had no professional or clinical counseling 
ministry, and its pastoral counseling was essentially reli-
gious in nature. Such counseling was often received through 
instruction, study, prayer and guidance, ami Ihrough mentoring 
relationships called "discipleships." According to the trial 
testimony of defendant Senior Pastor MacArthur, "Grace 
Community Church does not have a professional 01 clinical 
counseling ministry. We don't ruii a counseling center as 
such. We aren't paid for that, and we don't solicit that. 
We just respond as pastors, so what we do is on a spiritual 
level, and a biblical level, or a prayer level . . * in 
essence, defendants held themselves out as pastoral counselors 
able to deal with a variety of problems — not as 
professional, medical or psychiatric counselors. 
In 1975, Nally was seeing a secular psychologist 
to discuss problems he was having with his girlfriend M" lei 
graduating from UCLA in 1976, he spent one semester at Biola 
College in La Mirada and was em oiled in the Talbot Theological 
Seminary's extension on defendants' church grounds, During 
this time, Nally became involved in a relationship with a 
girlfriend who was a fellow bible student. In January 1978, 
he established a "discipling relationship" with Pastor Red 
with whom he often discussed girlfriend and family problems. 
They met five times in early ] 978, but when Nally lost 
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interest in "discipling," the meetings were discontinued.2/ 
Following the breakup with his girlfriend in 
December 1978, Nally became increasingly despondent. Pastor 
Cory encouraged him to seek the counsel of either Pastor 
Thomson or Rea. The friendship with Cory and the five 
discipling sessions with Rea in early 1978, constituted the 
full extent of the "counseling" Nally received from defendants 
before the spring of 1979. 
In February 1979, Nally told his mother he could 
not "cope." She arranged for him to see Dr. Milestone, a 
general practitioner, who prescribed Elavil, a strong anti-
depressant drug, to relieve his depression. Milestone also 
recommended Nally undergo a series of blood and chemical tests. 
The record reveals that Milestone never referred Nally to a 
psychiatrist. 
By late February, Nally*s depression did not appear 
to be subsiding, and he was examined by Dr. Oda, a physician, 
who did not prescribe medication or refer Nally to a psychia-
trist, but suggested he undergo a physical examination. 
Shortly thereafter, Nally spoke briefly in a drop-in counsel-
ing session with Pastor Thomson about the marital tensions 
between his parents and his problems with his current girl-
£/ Contrary to statements in Justice Kaufman's concurrence, 
our review of the record reveals that Rea did not become aware 
Nally could not cope in the physical sense until after his 
suicide attempt. Indeed, the record, when viewed in context, 
shows that when Nally told Pastor Rea that he "could not cope" 
and just could not "live this life," he was referring to 
leading the "Christian life." 
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friend. He told Thomson that he had considered suicide in 
1974 while a student at UCLA. The record shows that 
Thomson's conversation with Nally focused on their common 
faith in scripture. During this time, Nally "decided to 
serve the Lord through law," and was accepted at a Southern 
California law school for the 1979 fall semester. 
B. The Events Preceding Nallv's Suicide 
On March 11, 1979# Nally took an overdose of the 
antidepressant prescribed by Dr. Milestone. Plaintiffs found 
him the following day and rushed him to a hospital. At the 
hospital, Dr. Evelyn, Nally's attending physician, advised 
plaintiffs that because their son "was actually suicidal," 
she could not authorize his release from the hospital until 
he had seen a psychiatrist. The record indicates that 
plaintiffs, concerned about their friends* reactions to their 
son's suicide attempt, asked Dr. Evelyn to inform other 
persons that Nally had been hospitalized only for the 
aspiration pneumonia he suffered after the drug overdose 
rendered him unconscious. 
On the afternoon of March 12, Pastors MacArthur and 
Rea visited Nally at the hospital. Nally, who was still 
drowsy from the drug overdose, separately told both pastors 
3/ Our review of the record reveals that although Thomson 
recalled that Nally mentioned he had considered suicide while 
a student at UCLA, and concluded there was a "vague 
possibility" that Nally could consider suicide in the future, 
he did not believe Nally's "intimation of suicide" gave rise 
to a "serious enough likelihood where other help would be 
needed at [that] point." 
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that he was sorry he did not succeed in committing suicide. 
Apparently, MacArthur and Rea assumed the entire hospital 
staff was aware of Nally's unstable mental condition, and they 
did not discuss Nally's death-wish comment with anyone else. 
Four days later, Dr. Hall, a staff psychiatrist at 
the hospital, examined Nally and recommended he commit himself 
to a psychiatric hospital. When both Nally and his father 
expressed reluctance at the thought of formal commitment, Hall 
agreed to release Nally for outpatient treatment, but warned 
Nally's father that it would not be unusual for a suicidal 
patient to repeat his suicide attempt. Nally was released 
from the hospital by Drs. Hall and Evelyn the next day. 
On his release from the hospital on March 17, 1979, 
Nally arranged to stay with Pastor MacArthur, because he did 
not want to return home. MacArthur encouraged Nally to keep 
his appointments with Dr. Hall, and arranged for him to see 
Dr. John Parker, a physician and Church deacon, for a physical 
examination. Parker's testimony reveals that Nally told him 
he was depressed, had entertained thoughts of suicide, and had 
recently taken an overdose of Elavil. After examining Nally, 
Parker believed he was a continuing threat to himself, and 
recommended Nally commit himself to a psychiatric hospital. 
Nally, however, immediately rejected the advice. 
Parker testified that after Nally left his office, 
he telephoned Glendale Adventist Hospital to determine whether 
any beds were available. He then informed Nally's father that 
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Nally needed acute psychiatric care and that he should contact 
Glendale Adventist Hospital for information concerning the 
psychiatric facilities. That same evening, Nallyfs father 
telephoned Dr. Hall and told him that Parker had recommended 
psychiatric hospitalization. Hall offered to come to the 
Nally residence and arrange for Nally's involuntary 
commitment; the offer was rejected by plaintiffs. The record 
shows that Mrs. Nally strongly opposed psychiatric 
hospitalization for her son, saying, "no, that's a crazy 
hospital. He's not crazy." 
Eleven days before his suicide, Nally met with 
Pastor Thomson for spiritual counseling. According to the 
record, Nally asked Thomson whether Christians who commit 
suicide would nonetheless be "saved." Thomson referred Nally 
to his training as a seminary student and acknowledged "a 
person who is once saved is always saved," but told Nally that 
"it would be wrong to be thinking in such terms." Following 
their discussion, Thomson made an appointment for Nally to see 
Dr. Bullock for a physical examination but did not refer Nally 
to a psychiatrist. 
Several days later, Nally moved back home. During 
his final week of life, he was examined separately by Drs. 
Bullock and Evelyn. Dr. Bullock testified that he was 
concerned with Nally's physical symptoms. (Nally complained 
of headaches and of the fact that his arm was paralyzed 
because he had slept on it while he was unconscious following 
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the Elavil overdose.) Bullock suggested to Nally that S 
admit himself to the hospital. Hulluck, however, cl i 
refer Nally to a psychiatrist; instead, he subsequently 
conferred with Dr. Evelyn, and both doctors agreed Nally 
needed further physical and possibly psyi "hi d\ i i c ev i  1 ual i i urn . 
The day after his visit with Bullock, Nally 
encountered Pastor Thomson in the Church parking lot, Nally 
told Thomson that he was thinking of seeing «-« p.sychnioqist. 
Thomson recommended Nally contact Dr. Mohline, Director of the 
Rosemead Graduate School of Professional Psychology The 
following day, Nally spent approximately 9 0 minutes wilti 
Mohline# who in turn referred him to the Fullerton 
Psychologic^ J Clinic, Nally and t i:i s father went to the clinic 
the next day, and Nally discussed possible therapy with Mi. 
Raup, a registered psychologist * ?< assistant Raup testified 
he believed that NalJy was ". ,, *g to H therapist or 
counselor or psychologist" and that he was not going to return 
1 ••* clinic. At the end of the week, Nally met with a 
former girlfriend. She " • • ,!l down an appaipnt marriage 
proposal by telling Nally can't marry you when you BTR 
like this You have got to pull yourself together. You have 
got to put God first in yMii lil< " The nexl flay *.« ly left 
plaintiffs' home following a family disagreement, Fwo days 
later, he was found in a friend's apartment, dead of a 
self-inflicted gunshot wound. 
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III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. Allegations of the Complaint 
As stated above, the Nally I Court of Appeal 
reversed, in a published opinioi summary judgment for 
defendants. 1 f I he complaint, 
alleging wrongful death based on "clergyman malpractice* and 
negligence, plaintiffs asserted that defendant Church was 
negligent in the 11:ai i :ii i ig, se 1 e c t i o n and hii i:i i 1 g of :i ts 
spiritual counselors. Plaintiffs also claimed that following 
Nally"s suicide attempt by drug overdose, defendants failed to 
make themselves avail a b 1 e t o N a 1 1 y f o r n HI n s c? 1 i ng and 
"actively and affirmatively dissuaded and discouraged [Nally] 
from seeki ng further professional psychological and/or 
psychiatric care," 
The third count incorporated the negligence 
al leqat ion"' ly i cjf>i ence and charged defendants with 
outrageous conduct for teaching certain Protestant religious 
doctrines that conflicted with Nally's Catholic upbringing and 
which "n1 IIP rwi M» PI are i baf fiT* Nally's "pre-existing feelings 
of guilt, anxiety and depression.'"""" (I n t h i s c o n t e 11 , 
plaintiffs claimed one of the defendants told Nally that his 
temporarily pa r a .1 yzerl anii i;aused by his suicide attempt was 
"God punishing him" for his sin ) P] aintiff.s also al 1 eyi/"il 
that defendants' conduct in counseling Nally was outrageous 
because the} "I aught oi otherwise imbued [Nally], whom they 
knew to be depressed and having entertained suicidal tiioi igl its, 
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with the notion that if he had accepted Jesus Christ as his 
personal savior # [he] would still be accepted into heaven if 
he committed suicide." Here, plaintiffs ii-lit'd oil Thomson's 
statement to Nally 11 days before his suicide that one who is 
saved is "always saved," and on a short passage taken from a 
12-part tape recorded series, entitled "Ri cl" "Thomson: 
Principles of Biblical Counseling/" t .ha1 was a recording < 
Pastor Thomson's ] 980 classroom lectures to seminary 
students. 
The tape-recorded passage was recorded 1 8 months 
after N a 3 1 y s s i 11 c :i d e a i :i d stated, i r I p e 11 i n e n t pa r 11 " A n d the 
suicidal says, •I am under such tremendous pressure, now I've 
got to have pleasure of release! Now! I don't care about the 
future! T h a t",! s c h a r a c t e r I s t * . • : * r 
characteristic of the suicidal that • *-rf t judgment 
that drives him into the death after which he will face that 
judgment if In ". i-iii unibf; I i pvei find a l l e i which, :i f he IF HI 
b e l i e v e r , he Ml go to be with the Lord 
B. Procedural History 
A i t e i i. o n s i d e r i n y t h f > a t in v i« e </ i ni * ; n e i.11
 f tin*1 f; i i a L 
court granted summary judgment the basis that p la in t i f f s 
had fai led to raise a tr iable issue of fact; The t r i a l court 
s t a t e d at. HIP lime of the m l i n q , "RMiqion lias nolliing I o h'\ 
with th is case." 
Although the Court of Appeal an Nally I reversed the 
summa ry j udgmen t s ep a r a I *•> I y t:! i s r s s t In« f I i s I I wr» 
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counts alleging "clergyman malpractice" and negligence, but 
iiisf eacl! focused on the third cause - * action for wrongful 
death based intentional inf lie en.'I noiial rl i st r i: sis 
The court held the third cause of action was adequately 
pleaded ai id 1 ,i: iable issues of fact remained as to whether 
Nally's suicide was caused by defendants""' allnyedlv oul i ayccnhs 
conduct. It based reversal on (i) a declaration of Nally's 
fathei t.hat after Nally's hospitalization in March 1979, he 
opened Pastor Cory's office door during one of the p a s t o r i 
counseling sessions with Nally and found Nally on his knees 
cryino ami <" i i I nn U I H dp pus i t 1 on testimony of Pastor 
MacArthur that spiritual counseling (such as he gave Nal ly) 
could potentially cause "the deepest depression." In 
addition, I ht> lumit iir'licd on t ht« tape C X C I M j"t , quoted in part 
above, as raising a reasonable inference defendants followed a 
policy of counseling suicidal persons that suicide was an 
acceptable a 1 tei jwit t vc in living line Nal.ly 1 couit rejected 
defendants' First Amendment defense to the admissibility of 
the tape • • that the f i ee exercise of religion clause forbids 
imposing liabilifv mc-iely becnuse a ihijich tiachei suii irli-
does not lead to eternal damnation. 
Following the Court of Appeal's decision in Nally I, 
de f end ant s petit i oned t h :i s c oi I i: t: £ o r r e v i ew We denied r ev i ew 
and depublished the opinion. The case was returned to the 
f, i I a 1 con i I . 
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At trial after remand, four experts testified fo^ 
plaintiffs regarding tin1 ij«iieicji vtai'danl nf rare to be 
followed by the counseling community when dealing % a 
suicidal individual* Each witness testified that although 
standards varied among secular and d^nominational counselors/ 
a counselor has a duty to investigate the counseled persons 
suicidal tei idencies and to encourage that person to seek 
professional help once suicide becomes foreseeable Although 
plaintiffs attempted to show that defendants violated these 
standards, tl le si iggested standards are vague and dependent on 
the personal predilections of the i ndi v j tin a " cmrose J o i or 
denomination, and not officially or formally adopted by any 
organized body i.f cnunselcu 
Plaintiffs introduced severa J counse I i ny manua 11: 
that were apparently sold in the Church bookstore as 
supporting an inference that defendants advertised that its 
counselors were competent to treat a myriad of emotional 
problems, and as evidence of defendants' inadequate training 
as counselors. The manual a, liowevoi, while advocating "If a 
problem is not organically caused . . , the 
4/ The trial court refused to allow a witness from the 
American Pastoral Counseling Association to testify about the 
standards of care imposed by the association on member 
counselors. The court noted that defendants did not belong to 
the association, and that the group had not been accepted by 
the general pastoral counseling community as experts in the 
field of pastoral counseling. In any event, the record fails 
to indicate that defendants violated the foregoing unofficial 
rules of conduct. 
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w j" t 11 t 11 ] I jt f su i a m:e In- > if f «» God • s Word for i t,s proper 
solution," do not appear to have presented def end ant s at. 
anything other than pastoral counselors. 
11 i i1 ii 111 ig oi i the inonsuit m o t i o n , t h e t r i a l c o u r t 
noted that Nally voluntarily sought defendants""! counsel and 
that the court had no compelling reason to interfere in 
defendants" pjsl trial ari ivi1ies. The court stated: "There is 
r. compelling state interest to climb the wall of sepdidl , m 
i,u.rch [and state] and plunge into the pit on the other 
side that certainly lidd mi boiioin," The com it also found that 
even if the law were? to impose a "duty to refer," as urged by 
(i 1 d i ml i f f !• the evidence failed as a matter of law to show a 
breach of such duties cine,1 a l s v lailed is a matter of law Lo 
prove that defendants 1 conduct was the proximate cause ot 
Nail y •s death. Moreover, the court excluded, under Evidence 
Code section 352,5/ the tape -1ecorded excerpt fium Pastor 
Thomson's lecture series that Nally I had deemed essential to 
sustain the third count. In excluding the evidence, the trial 
court specifically stated that considerat u «" ot 1, litf 1, ape would 
not have affected its ultimate finding. 
5S Section 352 provides, "The court in its discretion may 
exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) 
necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create 
substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, 
or of misleading the jury." -The discretion granted the trial 
court by section 352 is not absolute [citations] and must be 
exercised reasonably in accord with the facts before the 
court." (Brainard v. Cotner (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 790, 796.) 
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The Court of Appeal again reversed, holding that 
although the "clergyman malpractice" count failed to state a 
cause of action separate from the "negligence" count/ both 
could be construed as stating a cause of action for the 
"negligent failure to prevent suicide" by "nontherapist 
counselors." In this context, the Court of Appeal held that 
nontherapist counselors — both religious and secular — have 
a duty to refer suicidal persons to psychiatrists or 
psychotherapists qualified to prevent suicides. Moreover, the 
court held, imposition of a negligence standard of care on 
pastoral counselors does not impinge on the free exercise of 
religion guaranteed by the First Amendment, because the 
state's compelling interest in the preservation of life 
justifies the narrowly tailored burden on religious expression 
imposed by such tort liability. Although the Court of Appeal 
found "the evidence sufficient to sustain a finding 
[defendant] Church negligently breached its duty to train its 
counselees in their responsibilities to refer suicidal 
counselors or to otherwise insure they were aware of the 
responsibilities . . . ," the court also found that there 
existed "sufficient evidence in the record for a reasonable 
person to have concluded some or all of [defendants'] 
counselors actually exercised reasonable care in attempting to 
refer [Nally] to mental health professionals authorized and 
equipped to prevent an imminent suicide." 
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The Court of Appeal also found that the trial 
court's grant of nonsuit for insufficiency of the evidence 
flowed from its erroneous exclusion of the tape-recorded 
excerpt in which Pastor Thomson discussed his view of suicide 
and salvation. The Court of Appeal determined that evidence 
of Thomson's "religious belief was "highly probative" of his 
past state of mind and an indication of the content of the 
religious counseling he may have given Nally. The majority 
rejected defendants' First Amendment defenses to intentional 
tort liability, claiming that under the law-of-the-case 
doctrine, Nally I was dispositive on whether the First 
Amendment would operate to relieve defendants of liability. 
Justice Cole dissented, asserting that the 
majority's holding rested on broad policy determinations best 
left to the Legislature. The dissent reasoned that the 
"essence of the duty imposed by the majority is to require the 
disclosures which existing law has declined to require." 
Furthermore, the dissent disagreed with the majority's 
imposition of liability on the third cause of action for 
wrongful death based on the intentional infliction of 
emotional distress on Nally, pointing out that the majority 
"ignored the record" and created an unconstitutional 
distinction between different ecclesiastic purposes. 
Our review of the record reveals the trial court 
correctly granted a nonsuit as to plaintiffs' causes of 
action. Neither the evidence adduced at trial nor well-
16 
established principles of tort law support the Court of 
Appeal's reversal of nonsuit in this case. As we explain 
below, we need not address the constitutional issues posed by 
defendants. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
A. Fpngyit 
A defendant is entitled to a nonsuit if the trial 
court determines that, as a matter of law, the evidence 
presented by plaintiff is insufficient to permit a jury to 
find in his favor. (Campbell v. General Motors (1982) 32 
Cal.3d 112, 117-118.) "In determining whether plaintiff's 
evidence is sufficient, the court may not weigh the evidence 
or consider the credibility of witnesses. Instead, the 
evidence most favorable to plaintiff must be accepted as true 
and conflicting evidence must be disregarded. The court must 
give 'to the plaintiff['s] evidence all the value to which it 
is legally entitled, . . . indulging every legitimate 
inference which may be drawn from the evidence in 
plaintiff['s] favor.1" (Id., at p. 118.) A mere "scintilla 
of evidence" does not create a conflict for the jury's 
resolution; "there must be substantial evidence to create the 
necessary conflict." (7 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) 
Trial, § 410, p. 413, italics in original.) 
In reviewing a grant of nonsuit, we are "guided by 
the same rule requiring evaluation of the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff." (Carson v. Facilities 
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Development Co. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 830, 839.) We will not 
sustain the judgment "'unless interpreting the evidence most 
favorably to plaintiff's case and most strongly against the 
defendant and resolving all presumptions, inferences and 
doubts in favor of the plaintiff a judgment for the defendant 
is required as a matter of law.'" (Ibid., quoting Mason v. 
Peaslee (1959) 173 Cal.App.2d 587, 588.) Keeping in mind the 
foregoing standard of review, we now turn to the merits. 
B. cevse of Action for Negligent Failure to Prevent Suicide 
As stated above, the Court of Appeal characterized 
the first two counts of plaintiffs' complaint (for clergyman 
malpractice and negligence) as together stating a cause of 
action for the "negligent failure [by a nontherapist 
counselor] to prevent suicide." Conceding that "research 
[did] not uncover any court decision which has ruled one way 
or the other specifically on the existence or scope of a 
nontherapist counselor's duty toward suicidal counselees," and 
that it was venturing "along a largely uncharted path," the 
Court of Appeal imposed a new and broad duty of care on such 
counselors without any discussion of causation under the 
present facts. 
As Justice Cole pointed out in his dissent, however, 
the obligation imposed by the majority is loosely phrased. 
Indeed, the Court of Appeal used widely varying terminology 
describing the duty of care arising under the first two causes 
of action. At different points in its opinion, the Court of 
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Appeal referred to the duty imposed on nontherapist counselors 
as a duty "to refer counselees to those who possess . . . 
powers to prevent an imminent suicide"; "to refer . . . to 
those individuals or institutions authorized and specially 
suited to prevent suicide"; "to take steps to place [a 
suicidal person] in the hands of those to whom society has 
given the authority and who by education and experience are in 
the best position to prevent the suicidal individual from 
succeeding in killing himself"; "informing those in a position 
to prevent the counselee's suicide about the factors 
suggesting the counselee's imminent plans to kill himself"; 
"to insure their counselees also are under the care of 
psychotherapists, psychiatric facilities, or others authorized 
and equipped to forestall imminent suicide"; and finally, "to 
take appropriate measures to prevent [a] suicide." As we 
explain below, we reject the Court of Appeal's imposition of 
a broad "duty to refer" on defendants and nontherapist 
counselors in general. 
1. Legal Requirements for Imposing a Duty of Care 
a) Creation pf g Duty 
"A tort, whether intentional or negligent, involves 
a violation of a legal duty, imposed by statute, contract or 
otherwise, owed by the defendant to the person injured. 
Without such a duty, any injury is 'damnum absque injuria* — 
injury without wrong. [Citations.]" (Witkin, Summary of Cal. 
Law (10th ed. 1988) Torts, § 6, p. 61, italics in original.) 
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Thus, in order to prove facts sufficient to support a finding 
of negligence, a plaintiff must show that defendant had a duty 
to use due care, that he breached that duty, and that the 
breach was the proximate or legal cause of the resulting 
injury. (United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes Inc. 
(1970) 1 Cal.3d 586, 594.) 
Under traditional tort law principles, one is 
ordinarily not liable for the actions of another and is under 
no duty to protect another from harm, in the absence of a 
special relationship of custody or control. (Davidson v. City 
of Westminister (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 203; Tarasoff v. Regents 
of Univ. of Cal. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 435.) Moreover, in 
determining the existence of a duty of care in a given case, 
we must consider several factors, including the 
"foreseeability of harm to [the injured party], the degree of 
certainty that [he] suffered injury, the closeness of the 
connection between [defendants'] conduct and the injury 
suffered, the moral blame attached to [defendants], the policy 
of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the 
defendant[s] and consequences to the community of imposing 
liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and 
prevalence of insurance for the risk involved." (Rowland v. 
Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 113.) Thus, because liability 
for negligence turns on whether a duty of care is owed, our 
first task is to determine whether a duty exists in the 
present case. 
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b) Specigi Relationship 
Although we have not previously addressed the issue 
presently before us, we have imposed a duty to prevent a 
foreseeable suicide only when a special relationship existed 
between the suicidal individual and the defendant or its 
agents. For example, two cases imposed such a duty in 
wrongful death actions after plaintiffs proved that the 
deceased committed suicide in a hospital or other in-patient 
facility that had accepted the responsibility to care for and 
attend to the needs of the suicidal patient. (See Meier v. 
Ross General Hospital (1968) 69 Cal.2d 420; Vistica v. 
Presbyterian Hospital (1967) 67 Cal.2d 465.) In Meier, a 
cause of action for negligence was held to exist against both 
the treating psychiatrist and the hospital, and in Vistica, 
liability was imposed on the hospital alone, the only named 
defendant in the case. 
The Court of Appeal here would extend the previously 
carefully limited precedent, relying initially for the 
creation of a duty of care (on defendants and other 
nontherapist counselors) in the foregoing Meier and Vistica 
cases. Indeed, the Court of Appeal specifically stated that 
"Logic and policy both dictate the duty announced in those 
cases applies to non-therapist counselors as well." We 
disagree. As defendants and amici curiae point out# Meier and 
Vistica are readily distinguishable from the facts of the 
present case and, as we explain, severely circumscribe the 
duty they create. 
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Both Meier and Vistica address the issue of a 
special relationship, giving rise to a duty to take 
precautions to prevent suicide, in the limited context of 
hospital-patient relationships where the suicidal person died 
while under the care and custody of hospital physicians who 
were aware of the patient's unstable mental condition. In 
both cases, the patient committed suicide while confined in a 
hospital psychiatric ward. Liability was imposed because 
defendants failed to take precautions to prevent the patient's 
suicide even though the medical staff in charge of the 
patient's care knew that the patient was likely to attempt to 
take his own life. 
Neither case suggested extending the duty of care to 
personal or religious counseling relationships in which one 
person provided nonprofessional guidance to another seeking 
advice and the counselor had no control over the environment 
of the individual being counseled. In sharp contrast, Nally 
was not involved in a supervised medical relationship with 
defendants, and he committed suicide well over two weeks after 
he was released from the hospital against the advice of his 
attending psychiatrist and physician. 
Plaintiffs and the Court of Appeal also rely on 
Bellah v. Greenson (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 614, 620-623, as 
supporting the existence of a special relationship sufficient 
to impose a duty of care on nontherapist counselors to refer a 
counselee to a licensed mental health professional once the 
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potential suicide becomes foreseeable. As we explain, the 
Court of Appeal would unduly extend the Bellah holding. 
In Bellah, two years after their daughter's suicide, 
plaintiffs brought a wrongful death action against a psychia-
trist who had been treating the daughter on an out-patient 
basis. Plaintiffs alleged the existence of a psychiatrist-
patient relationship between defendant and their daughter, 
knowledge on the part of the defendant that their daughter 
was likely to attempt suicide, and a failure by defendant to 
take appropriate preventative measures "consonant with good 
medical practice in the community." (Bellah, supra, 81 
Cal.App.3d at p. 620.) The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial 
court's order sustaining defendant's demurrer after concluding 
that the action was barred by the one-year statute of 
limitations contained in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5. 
In dictum, the Bellah court recognized that although 
plaintiffs' action was time barred, they had stated a 
traditional medical malpractice cause of action for the breach 
of a psychiatrist's duty of care to his patient. Bellah 
stated that this duty may be imposed on the treating 
psychiatrist even though his patient committed suicide outside 
the confines of a hospital. (Id., at p. 620.) It is 
important to recognize, however, that rather than creating a 
broad duty to refer, the Bellah court simply recognized that 
plaintiffs had stated a -cause of action for the breach by a 
medical practitioner of the duty of care owed to his patient 
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t h e c a u s a l connec t ion between defeiiilaii! s ' c iiekici and t lit 
injury suffered, and the foreseeability of the particular harm 
I i lif i in iiui ffil iJiHitv. ( R o w l a n d , s u p r a , 69 C a l . 2 d a t p . 1 1 3 ; 
see Davidson, supra, 3 ; Ca *! , lui 1 4 7 » /, bli ) 
Plaintiffs argue that Nally's statement to Pastors 
Rea and Mm" ftiiili u ("wf 1,1 If- hv was recovering from his s u i c i d e 
attempt at the h o s p i t a l ) , "I hat he w a s s o r r y he w 
successful and that he would attempt suicide after his release 
#"""'" weie "ha ddei I dangers" that would have 
affected his prognosis and treatment. Accordingly, pldi.nl -
reason that Rea and MacArthur should have warned 1 he hospital 
si ••*' • *•!-•' " contemplating 
suicide after L±L initia- attempt. We disagree. 
The closeness of connection between defendants 
c o n d u c t anil Pi i M ' i , - I J M id*» w *» I f n i m •« ^ +1- i i e s t '"' A s 
defendants observe, Nally was examined by five physicians and 
a psychiatrist during the weeks following his suicide 
a 1 1 e m p I : , I >e f e 11d a n 1, s c<1 r i frj i: 1 I \ ai s s (•"  i I I 11 a, t I t1 e y a r i" a n g e d o i 
encouraged many of these visits and encouraged Nally to 
continue to cooperate with all doctors.- | ee United States 
Li ab , I lit I , J if MB t , - '* 4 ) <1ci i t ion, as 
2 / Generally, there is a real question about the closeness 
of the causal connection between a nontherapist counselor's 
failure to refer to professional help and the suicide of a 
particular suicidal person. By their very definition/ 
nontherapist counselors are not professional medical experts 
on suicide. Their activities are undertaken pursuant to 
doctrines explicitly left unregulated by the state. (See post 
at pp. - [typed opn. at pp. 29-30].) 
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stated above# following Nallyfs overdose attempt Dr. Evelyn 
warned plaintiffs that Nally remained suicidal and that they 
should encourage him to see a psychiatrist on his release from 
the hospital. Plaintiffs also rejected both Dr. Hall9s and 
Dr. Parker's suggestion that Nally be institutionalized 
because, according to plaintiffs, their son was "not crazy." 
Nevertheless, we are urged that mere knowledge on 
the part of the defendants that Nally may have been suicidal 
at various stages in his life should give rise to a duty to 
refer. Imposition of a duty to refer Nally necessarily 
would imply a general duty on all nontherapists to refer all 
potentially suicidal persons to licensed medical practitioners. 
One can argue that it is foreseeable that if a 
nontherapist counselor fails to refer a potentially suicidal 
individual to professional, licensed therapeutic care, the 
individual may commit suicide. While under some circumstances 
counselors may conclude that referring a client to a 
psychiatrist is prudent and necessary, our past decisions 
teach that it is inappropriate to impose a duty to refer — 
which may stifle all gratuitous or religious counseling — 
based on foreseeability alone. Mere foreseeability of the 
harm or knowledge of the danger, is insufficient to create a 
legally cognizable special relationship giving rise to a legal 
duty to prevent harm. (See Davidson, supra, 32 Cal.3d 197, 
209.) 
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d) Public Policy Considerations 
Imposing a duty on defendants or other nontherapist 
counselors to# in the Court of Appeal's words, "insure their 
counselees [are also] under the care of psychotherapists, 
psychiatric facilities, or others authorized and equipped to 
forestall imminent suicide," could have a deleterious effect 
on counseling in general. (See Bellah, supra, 81 Cal.App.3d 
at p. 621.) Although both plaintiffs and the present Court of 
Appeal, in dictum, exempt services such as "teen hotlines" 
which offer only "band aid counseling," from a newly 
formulated standard of care that would impose a "duty to 
refer," the indeterminate nature of liability the Court of 
Appeal imposes on nontherapist counselors could deter those 
most in need of help from seeking treatment out of fear that 
their private disclosures could subject them to involuntary 
commitment to psychiatric facilities. 
As defendants, amici curiae, and the Court of Appeal 
dissenter observe, neither the Legislature nor the courts have 
ever imposed a legal obligation on persons to take affirmative 
steps to prevent the suicide of one who is not under the care 
of a physician in a hospital. (See Katona v. County of 
Los Angeles (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 53, 59; see also, Searcy 
v. Hemet Unified School District (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 792, 
804 [school district owes duty to safeguard student on school 
premises during school hours, but owes no such duty once the 
student has departed for home].) Indeed, for all practical 
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purposes, a doctor to whom a nontherapist counselor refers a 
suicidal person may refuse to take the patient. Furthermore, 
under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, 
§§ 5200, 5201), "[a]ny individual may" but is not required 
to institute involuntary commitment proceedings. 
We also note that the Legislature has exempted the 
clergy from the licensing requirements applicable to marriage, 
family, child and domes±jj:___counselors (Bus. & Prof. Code, 
§ 4980 et seq.) and from the operation of statutes regulating 
psychologists (id, § 2908 et seq.). In so doing, the Legisla-
ture has recognized_that—SQCe^s, to the clergy for counseling 
should be free from state imposed counseling standards, and 
that "the secular state is not equipped to ascertain the 
competence of counseling when performed by those affiliated 
with religious organizations." (Ericsson, Clergyman 
Malpractice: Ramifications of a New Theory (1981) 16 Val.U.L. 
Rev. 163, 176.) 
Furthermore, extending li^ ability to voluntary, 
noncommercial and noncustodial relationships is contrary to 
the trend in the Legislature to encourage private assistance 
efforts. This public policy goal is expressed in the acts of 
the Legislature abrogating the "Good Samaritan" rule. 
Statutes barring the imposition of ordinary negligence 
liability on one who aids another now embrace numerous 
scenarios. (See, e.g., Gov. Code, § 50086 [exempting from 
liability first aid volunteers summoned by authorities to 
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assist in search or rescue operations]; Health & Saf. Code, 
§§ 1799.100, 1799.102 [exempting from liability nonprofes-
sional persons giving cardiopulmonary resuscitation]*) 
On occasion, when the courts have recognized a new 
duty of care sufficient to impose liability for the breach 
thereof, they have noted that the "wrongs and injuries 
involved were both comprehensible and assessable within the 
existing judicial framework." (Peter W. v. San Francisco 
Unified Sch. Dist. (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 814, 824 [refusing to 
impose liability on school district for graduated plaintiffs 
inability to read and write]; see also, Dillon v. Legg (1968) 
68 Cal.2d 728, 742-747.) 
Even assuming that workable standards of care could 
be established in the present case, an additional difficulty 
arises in attempting to identify with precision those to whom 
the duty should apply. Because of the differing theological 
views espoused by the myriad of religions in our state^and 
practiced by church members, it would certainly be 
impractical, and quite possibly unconstitutional, to impose 
a duty of care on pastoral counselors. Such a duty would 
necessarily be intertwined with the religious philosophy of 
the particular denomination or ecclesiastical teachings of the 
religious entity. (See Esbeck, Tort Claims Against Churches 
and Ecclesiastical Officers: The First Amendment 
Considerations (1986) 89 W.Va.L.Rev. 1, 82-84; Comment, 
Religious Torts: Applying the Consent Doctrine as 
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Definitional Balancing (1986) 19 U.C.Davis L.Rev. 949, 
963-964, fn. 69; also, Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) 403 U.S. 
602.) We have previously refused to impose a duty when to do 
sojwould involve complex policy decisions, and we are 
unpersuadedby^plaintiffs that we should depart frorn^ this 
policy in the present case. (See Thomson v. County of Alameda 
(1980) 27 Cal.3d 741, 754-755; Bill v. Superior Court (1982) 
137 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1012-1013.) 
e) Availability of Insurance 
As several commentators observe, although lawsuits 
stemming from spiritual counseling are few, a new type of 
"clergyman malpractice" insurance has been offered to 
religious organizations to protect against potential liability 
for spiritual counseling that causes injury. (See, e.g., 
Note, Intentipngl Infliction pf Emptipnal Distress by 
Spiritual Counselors: Can Outrageous Conduct Be "Free 
Exercise?" (1986) 84 Mich.L.Rev. 1296, 1300, fn. 12.) 
Apparently, such insurance provides coverage to religious 
congregations and their pastors for damages caused by the 
counseling activities of the pastors while acting within the 
scope of their duties. (Ibid.) The value of such insurance, 
however, is unknown and difficult to determine because few 
cases have been filed against the clergy. 
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f) Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that 
plaintiffs have not met the threshold requirements for 
imposing on defendants a duty to prevent suicide. (Rowland, 
supra, 69 Cal.2d 108, 113.) Plaintiffs failed to persuade us 
that the duty to prevent suicide (heretofore imposed only on 
psychiatrists and hospitals while caring for a suicidal 
patient) or the general professional duty of care (heretofore 
imposed only on psychiatrists when treating a mentally 
disturbed patient) should be extended to a nontherapist 
counselor who offers counseling to a potentially suicidal 
person on secular or spiritual matters. 
In the present case, the Court of Appeal erroneously 
created a broad duty to refer, and to hold defendants 
potentially accountable for Nally's death based on their 
counseling activities would place blame unreasonably and 
contravene existing public policy.^ Accordingly, we 
conclude the trial court correctly granted defendants* nonsuit 
motion as to the "clergyman malpractice" or negligence causes 
of action. 
&f Our opinion does not foreclose imposing liability on 
nontherapist counselors, who hold themselves out as 
professionals, for injuries related to their counseling 
activities. 
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C. Cause of Action for Wrongful Death Based on Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress 
a) Elements pf the Tort 
The elements of a cause of action for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress are (i) outrageous conduct 
by defendant, (ii) an intention by defendant to cause, or 
reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional 
distress, (iii) severe emotional distress, and (iv) an actual 
and proximate causal link between the tortious conduct and 
the emotional distress. (Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection 
Dist. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 148, 155, fn. 7.) The w[c]onduct must 
be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually 
tolerated in a civilized community." (Davidson, supra, 32 
Cal.3d at p. 209, quoting from Cervantez v. J.C. Penny Co. 
(1979) 24 Cal.3d 579, 593.) As stated in part III hereof, the 
Court of Appeal limited its discussion of the third cause of 
action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, to 
the question of whether the trial court erred in (i) excluding 
the tape pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, and (ii) 
granting the nonsuit motion as to the intentional infliction 
of emotional distress count. 
We have found only one California case in which an 
appellate court affirmed a trial court decision overruling a 
demurrer and allowing a cause of action for wrongful death 
based on defendant's outrageous conduct in causing a suicide. 
In Tate v. Canonica (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 898, 909, the court 
allowed a widow to state a cause of action for wrongful death 
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based on intentional infliction of emotional distress after 
she alleged that defendant intentionally made threats and 
accusations against her husband and such conduct was a 
substantial factor in bringing about the husband*s suicide. 
The Tate court rejected as inapplicable to intentional torts, 
the defenses of supervening cause and contributory negligence. 
(Id., at p. 908.) Thus, under Tate, a plaintiff may resist a 
demurrer to a wrongful death action for intentional conduct 
leading to suicide if he can allege facts sufficient to show 
that defendant's conduct was outrageous and a substantial 
factor in the decedent's suicide. (Tate, supra, 180 
Cal.App.2d 898, 909.) With the foregoing in mind, we now turn 
to the present case in order to determine whether the trial 
court properly excluded the tape of Pastor Thomson's 1980 
lecture under Evidence Code section 352, or whether the 
evidence was relevant to proving plaintiffs' third cause of 
action consistently with the Tate and Davidson, supra, 32 
Cal.3d 197, standards. 
b) Procedural Background 
The Court of Appeal did not discuss defendants' 
First Amendment defenses to the admissibility of the tape 
recording, because it believed it was bound, under the law of 
the case doctrine (discussed below), by the holding in Nallv I 
that the First Amendment did not immunize defendants from 
liability. The court, however, did not believe it was 
prevented from examining the "sufficiency of the evidence 
introduced at trial to support the third count." 
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The court found, as did the Court of Appeal in 
Nallv I, that the tape recording was essential to establishing 
plaintiffs* cause of action for wrongful death based on 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and that its 
exclusion was therefore erroneous. The court stated that in 
"[c]onstruing the evidence [including the tape recording] most 
favorably to [plaintiffs] we conclude a reasonable juror could 
have found the counselors acted recklessly in a way which 
encouraged this suicide." 
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, do not address the 
merits of the trial court's exclusion of the tape but instead 
argue that the trial and appellate courts are bound by the 
law-of-the-case doctrine insofar as it precludes 
reconsideration of defendants' asserted constitutional 
defenses and the objections concerning the viability of 
plaintiffs* third cause of action for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress. Plaintiffs assert that we are bound by 
the appellate court ruling in Nally I that the facts of this 
case satisfy the requirements of the substantive tort of 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
c) £aw-Qf-the-C9ge Doctrine 
Under this doctrine, "the decision of an appellate 
court, stating a rule of law necessary to the decision of the 
case, conclusively establishes that rule and makes it 
determinative of the rights of the same parties in any 
subsequent retrial or appeal in the same case.* (9 Witkin, 
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Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 737, pp. 705-707.) The 
rule is not invoked where the sufficiency of the evidence 
necessary to sustain the judgment depends on the probative 
value or effect of the evidence itself, and the evidence in 
the second trial is changed. (9 Witkin, supra, § 750, at 
p. 718.) Similarly, the doctrine does not apply to points of 
law that might have been, but were not determined on the prior 
appeal. (9 Witkin, supra, § 752 at pp. 719-720; Tally v. 
Ganahl (1907) 151 C. 418, 421.) 
Recently, an additional reason for declining to 
apply the doctrine was announced in Searle v. Allstate Life 
Ins. Co. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 425, in which we held: "The primary 
purpose served by the law-of-the-case rule is one of judicial 
economy. Finality is attributed to an initial appellate 
ruling so as to avoid the further reversal and proceedings on 
remand that would result if the initial ruling were not adhered 
to in a later appellate proceeding . . . . [T]hat reason for 
the rule is inoperative when the court hearing the subsequent 
appeal determines that there should be a reversal on a ground 
that was not considered on the prior appeal. The fact that 
reversal is necessary in any event frees us from the compulsion 
that the rule of law of the case might otherwise impose on us 
to follow a ruling in the prior appeal that we do not perceive 
to be manifestly erroneous." (38 Cal.3d at p. 435.) 
We perceive no obstacle under the law-of-the-case 
doctrine to reviewing the evidentiary question regarding the 
tape recording's rdmissibility. Contrary to plaintiffs' 
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assertion that we are bound by a theoretical imposition of 
liability on defendants based on the findings in Nallv I, the 
Court of Appeal there found only that plaintiffs had raised a 
triable issue of fact sufficient to defeat a summary judgment 
motion, and therefore did not determine liability as 
plaintiffs seem to imply. 
As we explain below, however, we disagree with the 
Court of Appeal*s conclusion that the trial court improperly 
excluded the evidence under Evidence Code section 352. 
Accordingly, it is unnecessary to reach the broader 
constitutional issues raised by the parties, or the validity 
of the Court of Appeal's holding that the constitutional 
defense was barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine, 
d) Analysis pf the Evidently Ruling 
In 1981, 18 months after Nally's suicide, Pastor 
Thomson taught a series of classes of biblical counseling. 
The class sessions included question and answer periods that 
were tape recorded. During one session, a student questioned 
Thompson on whether a person who committed suicide could be 
"saved." Thompson replied, in a manner consistent with 
Reformation Protestant theology views regarding sin, grace and 
faith, that a person neither acquires salvation by his own 
works nor forfeits salvation by the commission of subsequent 
sins. Plaintiffs sought to introduce the tape recording at 
trial on the basis that it provided inferential proof of 
Thomson's advice to Nally during the three counseling sessions 
in 1979. 
38 
The court held extensive hearings outside the 
presence of the jury on the admissibility of the recording to 
determine whether its content was relevant. During the in 
camera sessions, the court pointed out that even if the 
recording were admitted, there was no evidence Thomson spoke 
similar words to Nally during their counseling sessions or 
that such words could have contributed in any way to, or 
proximately caused, Nally's death. The court also observed 
that the best way to establish what Thomson told Nally was 
through direct examination. Eventually, the court ruled 
it would not admit the recording, "on the basis that its 
relevancy is such that it would necessitate the undue 
consumption of time, would create substantial danger of 
undue influence to the jury and could confuse the issues 
and be misleading to the jury." (See Evid. Code, § 352.) 
In determining whether the trial court properly 
exercised discretion in excluding the tape, we consider 
the relationship between the evidence and the relevant 
inferences to be drawn from it. (See Kessler v. Gray (1978) 
77 Cal.App.3d 284, 291.) The Court of Appeal stated that the 
tape recording was relevant to prove Pastor Thomson's "own 
personal state of mind on the question of suicide and suicide 
counseling and how other counselors were trained on these 
issues." The court asserted that "the statements on the 
tape [were] relevant to prove the probable content of the 
counseling the defendants offered [to] the plaintiffs* 
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suicidal son. The tape recordings tend to establish the 
customary approach the Church*s counselors used when 
counseling suicidal individuals." These conclusions appear 
to misstate the relevant evidence. 
First, as the trial court found, the tape does not 
tend to prove that defendants in any way encouraged Nally to 
commit suicide or acted recklessly in disregard of Nally's 
emotional state prior to his suicide. (See People v. Jones 
(1954) 42 Cal.2d 219, 222.) Although there is some indication 
in the record that Nally may have attended some of defendants* 
bible classes between 1974 and 1979, there is no evidence that 
Thomson was ever asked about salvation and suicide during a 
lecture prior to 1980 or that he would have given a similar 
response at that time if he had been so asked. Moreover, as 
Thomson himself testified, his responses to questions in the 
classroom setting would by their very nature differ from the 
way he handled an individual counseling session because he 
would have considered the emotional state of the individual 
and his particular counseling needs during the counseling 
session. 
In addition, the evidence was simply too temporally 
remote to establish any causal connection with Nally*s 
suicide. As Justice Cole's dissent in the Court of Appeal 
observes, "what was said in an extemporaneous answer# which 
did not precisely reflect the thoughts of Pastor Thomson, 
given almost two years after the incident at issue is at best 
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marginally relevant to prove what was said at the time in 
question. The trial judge made a carefully considered 
decision after considerable deliberation. Clearly, there 
was a basis for the trial court's ruling that admission of 
the tape created substantial danger of misleading the jury 
and prejudicing the defendants." Based on the foregoing, 
we disagree with the Court of Appeal's conclusion that the 
response given by Pastor Thomson to an inquiry by a seminary 
student almost two years after Nally's suicide could assist 
in establishing what Pastor Thomson told Nally during the 
individual counseling sessions. 
Finally, "California trial judges have consider-
able discretion under Evidence Code section 352 to exclude 
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by its prejudicial effect.- (Michail v. Fluor Mining & 
Metals, Inc. (1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 284, 286.) Because the 
record shows that the trial court carefully and properly 
weighed the prejudicial effect of the evidence against its 
probative value, the Court of Appeal erred in finding that 
a substantial abuse of discretion occurred in excluding the 
evidence. 
V. CONCLUSION 
We conclude the trial court correctly granted a 
nonsuit on all causes of action. The suicide of a young 
man in the prime of his life is a profound tragedy. After 
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considering plaintiffs' arguments and evidence, however, we 
hold that defendants had no duty to Nally on which to base 
liability for his unfortunate death. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed and 
the Court of Appeal is directed to enter judgment affirming 
the judgment of nonsuit and dismissing the action. 
LUCAS, C.J. 
WE CONCUR: 
MOSK, J. 
PANELLI, J. 
ARGUELLES, J. 
EAGLESON, J. 
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NALLY v. GRACE COMMUNITY CHURCH 
S002882 
CONCURRING OPINION BY KAUFMAN, J. 
I concur in the judgment that nonsuit was properly 
granted, but disagree with the majority's holding that 
defendants owed no duty of care to the plaintiffs. 
The majority appears to reject the proposition that 
defendants in this matter, or "nontherapist counselors in 
general," have a duty to advise potentially suicidal 
counselees to seek competent medical care. (Maj. opn. at 
p. [typed opn. at p. 19].) Yet the majority does not 
purport to "foreclose imposing liability on nontherapist 
counselors, who hold themselves out as professionals, for 
injuries related to their counseling activities." (Maj. 
opn. at p. , fn. 8 [typed opn. at p. 33, fn. 8].) 
1 
In view of the majority's suggestion that a 
nontherapist counselor who holds himself out as competent to 
treat a suicidal person owes a duty of care to that person, 
I am baffled as to the basis or the necessity of the 
majority's broad conclusion that "nontherapist counselors in 
general" do not owe such a duty. The evidence in the 
record, viewed — as the law requires — in plaintiffs' 
favor, demonstrates that defendants (1) expressly held 
themselves out as fully competent to deal with the most 
severe psychological disorders, including major depression 
with suicidal symptoms, (2) developed a close counseling 
relationship with Kenneth Nally for that very purpose, and 
(3) realized that Nally's suicide was at least a 
possibility. Thus, the evidence was more than sufficient, 
in my view, to trigger a minimal duty of care to Nally. 
What was fatally absent from plaintiffs' case was not 
evidence of duty, but proof that defendants breached that 
duty, and that such breach constituted a proximate cause of 
Nally's suicide. Therefore, while I concur in the decision 
to reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal and to 
reinstate the judgment of nonsuit and dismissal of the 
action, I strongly disagree with the conclusion that 
defendants owed no duty of care in this matter. 
FACTS 
While the majority faithfully chronicles the tragic 
sequence of events which led to Nally*s suicide, it quite 
inexplicably overlooks the substantial evidence 
2 
adduced by plaintiffs relating to the nature and extent of 
the pastoral counseling offered by defendants. The picture 
which emerges from the record is decidedly not that of a 
small band of simple pastors who offered occasional 
counseling on minor matters to the faithful few. The Grace 
Community Church (Church), at the time of the events in 
question, employed about 50 pastoral counselors to serve a 
congregation of over 10,000 persons. Pastoral counseling, 
as described in the Church's 1979 annual report, constituted 
"a very important part of the ministry at Grace Church." 
Church counselors offered their services not only to 
congregants, but to large numbers of nonmembers as well. In 
1979, the annual report noted, about 50 percent of those 
seeking counseling came from outside the Church. 
Furthermore, while much of the counseling to members was 
apparently of an ad hoc or "drop-in" nature, more formal 
counseling was offered as well, with regularly scheduled 
counseling "sessions" much like those between a therapist 
and a patient; indeed, the Church employed a secretary whose 
responsibilities included the making and scheduling of such 
counseling appointments. Moreover, in addition to 
individual counseling, a number of Church pastors taught 
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classes, published books and sold tape recordings on the 
subject of biblical counseling.I' 
In addition to the foregoing, plaintiffs adduced 
substantial evidence relating to the stated ability of the 
Church's pastoral counselors to deal with serious emotional 
and psychological disorders. Several of the counselors 
testified that they considered themselves fully competent to 
treat a whole range of mental illnesses, including 
depression and schizophrenia — indeed, as Pastor Thomson 
testified, "any type of emotional problem." Several of the 
A' Contrast this picture of the Church's extensive 
involvement in pastoral counseling (based on evidence in the 
record), with that portrayed in the majority opinion. The 
majority writes: "According to the trial testimony of 
defendant Senior Pastor MacArthur, 'Grace Community Church 
does not have a professional or clinical ministry. We don't 
run a counseling center as such. We aren't paid for that, 
and we don't solicit that . . . .'" (Maj. opn. at p. 
[typed opn. at p. 4].) While not a major point in itself, 
such selective citation of the record undoubtedly colors 
one's overall assessment of the case, and to that extent is 
objectionable. As the majority itself notes, on review of a 
nonsuit "the evidence most favorable to plaintiffTsl must be 
accepted as true and conflicting evidence must be 
disregarded. The court must give to the plaintiffTs'1 
evidence all the value to which it is legally entitled, 
. . . indulging every legitimate inference which may be 
drawn from the evidence in plaintiff fs'1 favor." (Campbell 
v. General Motors (1982) 32 Cal.3d 112, 117-118, italics 
added.) The majority has reversed this fundamental 
principle of appellate review, stating the evidence, 
resolving all factual conflicts, and drawing all reasonable 
inferences in favor of defendants. Moreover, in addition to 
the above example, violations of this principle occur 
throughout the majority opinion. (See fns. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 
post, at pp. [typed opn. at pp. 6, 7-8, 9-10, 10-11].) 
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counselors who testified, including Pastors Rea, Barshaw and 
Thomson, claimed to possess not only competence, but broad 
experience in the counseling of persons with recurrent 
suicidal or even homicidal tendencies. 
This asserted capacity to handle severe 
psychological disorders was also reflected in a Church 
publication entitled "Guide For Biblical Counselors" 
(Guide). Pastor Thomson was the author of the Guide, which 
served as a basic text for aspiring biblical counselors and 
was required reading in Thomson's class on biblical 
counseling. According to Pastor Thomson, absent a gross 
physiological cause such as a brain tumor, "every emotional 
problem" was within the competence of the pastoral counselor 
to handle. Among the symptoms or disorders the Guide listed 
as falling within the pastoral counselor's domain were "drug 
abuse, alcoholism, phobias, deep depression, suicide, mania, 
nervous breakdown, manic-depressive [disorder] and 
schizophrenia." The Guide devoted separate sections to a 
number of these disorders, including suicide, with 
hypothetical questions and answers interspersed throughout 
the text. One such exchange read as follows: "[Question]: 
You mean 1 could counsel with an extreme problem like a 
suicidal tendency or nervous breakdown or something like 
that? M[] [Answer]: With the proper understanding of 
God*s Word to diagnose and treat the problems, this could 
5 
not only be done occasionally but could become the rule.H^/ 
Nally was well aware of defendants' self-proclaimed 
proficiency at treating severe depression and suicidal 
symptoms. Nally was a student in Pastor Thomson's course on 
biblical counseling, which used the Guide as a text, and 
affirmatively sought out formal or informal pastoral 
counseling from defendants during each of his several 
suicidal crises. 
Moreover, the record leaves no doubt that 
defendants were aware of, and affirmatively undertook to 
deal with, Nally's recurrent depression and suicidal 
thoughts. In January 1978, Nally initiated a counseling 
relationship with Pastor Rea. Rea testified that he had 
formal counseling sessions with Nally during the first four 
months of 1978, as well as many informal sessions both 
before and after that time. During these sessions, 
according to Pastor Rea, Nally often appeared distraught and 
*•' How the majority could omit from its opinion this 
extensive evidence of defendants' "holding out" is quite 
beyond my understanding. (See fn. 1, ante, at p. [typed 
opn. at p. 4] .) 
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cried, indicating that he "couldn't cope." Rea specifically 
recalled Nally's statement to him in his office, "I just 
can't live this life." Rea, who considered himself both 
qualified and experienced in the handling of depressed and 
sucidal individuals, evaluated Nally as being 
"depressed."3/ 
3/ The majority asserts that I have mischaracterized 
Rea's testimony, that in fact "Rea did not become aware 
Nally could not cope in the physical sense until after his 
suicide attempt." (Maj. opn. at p. [typed opn. at p. 5, 
fn. 2, original italics.) On the contrary, the majority 
either ignores the full record of Rea's testimony or, 
contrary to fundamental principles of appellate review, 
draws only those inferences favorable to defendants. It 
must be recalled that Rea was testifying as a hostile 
witness under Evidence Code section 776; his responses on 
direct examination were both dissembling and contradictory. 
Time and again, Rea was impeached with his own counseling 
notes or prior deposition testimony. So it was with his 
testimony regarding Nally's expressed inability to "cope." 
Initially, Rea admitted that Nally had stated that from time 
to time he could not "cope." Rea immediately denied, 
however, that the "cope concept" had "come out" until after 
Nally's first suicide attempt. Counsel then confronted Rea 
with his own counseling notes, and Rea was forced to admit 
that just the opposite was true. 
"Q: Isn't it your recollection that from January 
forward, Ken frequently used that term, 'I don't know how to 
cope.'? 
"A: Frequently? I can't say that, but I wrote 
down to express what Ken expressed to me. 
"Q: And from time to time he used that phrase? 
"A: I would have to say so from that record. 
"Q: From time to time he used it before you 
terminated the formal counseling relationship? 
"A: That's true. 
"Q: Thank you." 
Later, Rea attempted to characterize Nally's 
comments as referring exclusively to the "spirituals not 
the "physical" life. When confronted with his prior 
deposition testimony, however, Rea was compelled to concede 
that the idea of suicide was fairly inferable from Nally's 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
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In 1974/ when Nally first joined the Church, he 
developed a close friendship with Pastor Cory# who was 
(Footnote continued from previous page,) 
statements and conduct during the counseling sessions: 
"Q: Was there an inference of suicide? 
MA: Not to my knowledge. 
"Q: Look to page 70 of your depo. Read from line 
7 on down. 
MMR. COOKSEY: How far, counsel? 
"MR. BARKER: Down through line 22. 
MQ: BY MR. BARKER: Does that refresh your 
recollection? 
"A: Yes. 
MQ: Was there an inference of suicide in some of 
the things Ken said? 
"A: Inference in the extent (sic) of coping and 
how far you stretch the word/ not being able to live this 
life# but the life is not physical life; it's the spiritual 
life. 
MQ: There was an inference of suicide in some of 
the things Ken said during the normal counseling sessions? 
"A: It could be construed that way. 
"Q: And the term inference was your term: is that 
correct? 
MA: Xes.M (Italics added.) 
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable 
to plaintiffs, it is reasonable to conclude that Nally's 
statements and actions during his counseling sessions with 
Rea reasonably indicated the possibility of suicide. The 
point, it should be stressed/ is not that defendants knew or 
should have known that Nally would commit suicide; the 
point/ rather, is that the evidence was sufficient to raise 
the reasonable possibility, and the reasonable possibility 
was sufficient to trigger a minimal duty to advise Nally to 
seek competent medical care. 
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responsible for overseeing the ministry to the collegians 
attending the Church. In December 1978, after Nally's 
breakup with his girlfriend, Cory became concerned about 
Nally*s apparent depression and referred him to Pastors Rea 
or Thomson for counseling. In late February or early March 
of 1979, Nally did approach Pastor Thomson and told him that 
he was depressed about his relationship with his girlfriend 
and his family. Nally told Thomson that he had once before 
considered suicide. Thomson, who considered himself both 
qualified and experienced in the counseling of severe 
depression, felt that there was an "intimation" of suicide 
in Nally's statements and concluded that suicide was a 
"vague possibility."4/ Although Thomson testified that he 
3/ The majority suggests that I have mischaracterized 
the record of Thomson's testimony. (Maj. opn. at p. , 
fn. [typed opn. at p. 6, fn. 3].) On the contrary, the 
majority has simply construed the evidence most favorably to 
defendants, rather than, as the law requires, indulging all 
reasonable inferences in favor of plaintiffs. 
In fact, Thomson testified as follows: 
"Q: You reached the conclusion, didn't you, at the 
end of your first meeting with Ken in March, that Ken might 
try suicide? 
HA: There was that vague possibility, yes. I 
didn't conclude within myself that it was a serious enough 
likelihood where other help would be needed at this point, 
so I counseled him and prayed for him. 
"Q: Did you think that Ken, in fact, might try 
suicide? 
"A: It was a possibility. It was a vague 
possibility, yes. 
Thomson further testified: 
"Q: And you then concluded, after your questioning 
session, that although there was some possibility of 
suicide, it wasn't likely? 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
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took such intimations •'seriously," he concluded that he 
could continue to help Nally with his problems through 
counseling and prayer. 
Several weeks later, after Nally had in fact 
attempted suicide, Nally approached Thomson on two more 
separate occasions. During their second informal meeting, 
which lasted about an hour, Nally again, according to 
Thomson, -intimated" suicide and again Thomson concluded 
that suicide was a "possibility" which he continued to take 
"seriously.M£/ During the third meeting between Nally and 
Thomson, the latter remained convinced that suicide was a 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
"A: That's true." 
Elsewhere he testified: 
"Q: And you concluded that he probably wasn't 
going to commit suicide, but it was a possibility? 
"A: It was a vague possibility, yes. 
"Q: You took that possibility seriously? 
"A: Yes. 
"Q: And in taking it seriously, you talked with 
him about biblical concepts and about what his inter [sic] 
strifes were that led to his depression and led to his 
suicidal feelings? 
"A: Yes. 
"Q: But you did not talk to anyone else after that 
meeting with Ken about the fact that Ken might be a threat 
to himself before the Verdugo attempt? 
"A: Not that I recall." 
5S Concerning this second meeting, Thomson testified 
as follows: 
"Q: And in that second visit, the suicide was 
discussed again, wasn't it? 
"A: Yes. There was that possibility . . . . 
"Q: In trying to help him as he was down, did you 
indirectly make an effort to find out if he was going to try 
again? 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
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"possibility."&S Although Thomson was persuaded that Nally 
was depressed and "intimat[ing]M suicide, he continued to 
believe that he could help him through biblical counseling. 
After Nally was released from the hospital 
following his suicide attempt in March 1979, he went to stay 
with another Church counselor, Pastor MacArthur. During 
long discussions over the next week, Nally discussed his 
depression and thoughts of suicide, and MacArthur became 
convinced that suicide was a real possibility. Indeed, 
MacArthur became so concerned from these sessions that he 
advised Nally to see a psychiatrist. One week after Nally 
left the MacArthur residence, his fears were realized. On 
April 1, 1979, Nally committed suicide. 
DISCUSSION 
In light of the foregoing factual background, I 
believe the conclusion is inescapable that defendants owed a 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
"A: There was that intimation there, and that's as 
far as I wanted to carry it." 
&S Thomson testified as follows concerning the third 
meeting: 
"Q: Were you — at that time, you still took 
seriously Ken's suicidality, didn't you? 
•'A: Yes. 
"Q: And at that time, as with the first two 
visits, you still felt there was a chance Ken was going to 
commit suicide? 
"A: There was a possibility." 
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duty of care to Nally. That duty, in my view, was simply to 
recognize the limits of their own competence to treat an 
individual, such as Nally, who exhibited suicidal 
tendencies, and once having recognized such symptoms, to 
advise that individual to seek competent professional 
medical care. The record further demonstrates, however, and 
the majority correctly concludes, that defendants neither 
breached their duty to Nally nor contributed in any legally 
significant respect to his suicide.IS 
It is black-letter law that one may have an 
affirmative duty to protect another from harm where a 
"special relationship" exists. (Williams v. State of 
California (1983) 34 Cal.3d 18, 23; Weirum v. RKO General, 
Inc. (1975) 15 Cal.3d 40, 48; Clarke v. Hoek (1985) 174 
Cal.App.3d 208, 215-216; Rest.2d Torts, § 314; Prosser St 
Keeton, Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 56, p. 374.) The critical 
-*-' Unfortunately, the majority's analysis fails to 
properly distinguish between duty and proximate cause. 
Based upon a misunderstanding of our seminal decision in 
Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, the majority 
implies that lack of causation precludes the imposition of a 
duty. This is a misreading of Rowland. That decision 
merely held that the "closeness of the connection between 
the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered" was one of 
a number of factors which might justify a departure from the 
general principle that "all persons are required to use 
ordinary care to prevent others from being injured as a 
result of their conduct." (Id. at pp. 112-113.) 
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question, therefore, is whether there existed some special 
relationship between Nally and defendants which would give 
rise to an affirmative duty to act. 
In the special case of determining the existence of 
an affirmative duty to protect another, courts have 
traditionally looked to relationships where "the plaintiff 
is typically in some respect particularly vulnerable and 
dependent upon the defendant who, correspondingly, holds 
considerable power over the plaintiffs welfare." (Prosser 
& Keeton, supra, at p. 374.) 
The special relationship that arises between a 
patient and his doctor or psychotherapist creates an 
affirmative duty to see that the patient does no harm either 
to himself (Bellah v. Greenson (1978) 81 Cal.App.3d 614, 
619)^/ or to others (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of 
&S The majority suggests that I have mischaracterized 
the court's holding in Bellah v. Greenson, supra, 81 
Cal.App.3d 614. Not so. The Bellah court stated the issues 
before it as follows: "[I]n the present case, we must 
determine whether plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient 
to give rise to a duty on the part of defendant to take 
steps to prevent [decedent! from committing suicide or to 
advise [decedent's parents] about the existence of 
conditions which caused [decedent] to take her own life, so 
that they could take such steps." (Id. at p. 619, italics 
added.) The Bellah court answered the first question as 
follows: "Here, the complaint alleged the existence of a 
psychiatrist-patient relationship between defendant and 
[decedent], knowledge on the part of the defendant that 
[decedent] was likely to attempt suicide, and a failure by 
defendant to take appropriate preventive measures. We are 
satisfied that these allegations are sufficient to state a 
cause of action for the breach of a psychiatrist's duty of 
(Footnote continued on next page.) 
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California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 436-437). The relation of 
the nontherapist or pastoral counselor to his counselee 
contains elements of trust and dependence which closely 
resemble those that exist in the therapist-patient context. 
Defendants here patently held themselves out as competent to 
counsel the mentally ill, and Nally responded to these 
inducements, placing his psychological and ultimately his 
physical well-being in defendants' care. Whether defendants 
adequately fulfilled their responsibilities to Nally is a 
separate question to which I will turn in a moment. That 
defendants had some responsibilities to fulfill, however, is 
not, in my view, open to question. 
Nor is the nature of defendants' duty to Nally 
especially difficult to perceive. As in every negligence 
case, the precise nature of the defendant's duty will 
necessarily vary with the facts. (Tarasoff v. Regents of 
University of California, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 439.) In 
each instance, the adequacy of the nontherapist counselor's 
(Footnote continued from previous page.) 
care towards his patient." (Id. at p. 620, italics added.) 
My summary of the Bellah court's holding is accurate. A 
psychiatrist's duty is to take reasonable steps to prevent a 
patient's suicide. This does not imply, as the majority 
asserts, that a psychiatrist can guarantee his patients' 
safety. On the contrary, as Justice Mosk has observed, 
"psychiatric predictions of violence are inherently 
unreliable." (Tarasoff v. Regents of University of 
California, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 451 (cone, and dis. opn. 
of Mosk, J.).) 
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conduct must be judged according to what is reasonable under 
the circumstances. (Ibid.) Where, as here, defendants have 
invited and engaged in an extensive and ongoing pastoral 
counseling relationship with an individual whom they 
perceive to be suicidal, both reason and sound public policy 
dictate that defendants be required to advise that 
individual to seek professional medical care. 
The point, which the majority persistently 
misperceives, is not that Pastors Rea or Thomson or anyone 
else should have known that Nally would, in fact, commit 
suicide. The point rather, is that the evidence, read in 
the light most favorable to plaintiffs, presents a triable 
issue as to whether defendants knew or should have known 
that suicide was a sufficient possibility to require that 
defendants advise Nally to seek competent medical care. 
Notwithstanding the majority opinion's conclusion to the 
contrary, the evidence in the record leaves no room for 
doubt on this question. 
It has been suggested that both public policy and 
the constitutional right to the "free exercise" of religion 
militate against the recognition of a duty of care in these 
circumstances. I cannot agree. 
The "policy" considerations most often mentioned 
are the possibilities that a duty of care "could deter those 
most in need of help from seeking treatment out of fear that 
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their private disclosures could subject them to involuntary 
commitment to psychiatric facilities,* (Maj. opn. at p. 
[typed opn. at p. 29]) or that such a duty could discourage 
"private assistance efforts." (Maj. opn. at p. [typed 
opn. at p. 30].) Such concerns are unfounded. The scope of 
the duty contemplated is commensurate with the nontherapist 
counselor's background and stated mission. Unless he also 
happens to be a licensed therapist, his duty in most cases 
would not require disclosure of confidential communications, 
but would simply require that he advise the counselee to 
seek competent medical care. 
Concerns about the possible exposure of counseling 
"hot lines" or even well-meaning friends to liability, are 
equally misplaced. There is simply no meaningful 
resemblance between such activities and the sort of 
counseling relationship at issue here. 
Finally, it is urged that the imposition of a duty 
of care on defendants would unconstitutionally burden their 
First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. 
There is no merit to this contention. 
While the First Amendment bars the government from 
"prohibiting the free exercise of religion," religiously 
motivated conduct "remains subject to regulation for the 
protection of society." (Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 
U.S. 296, 303-304; accord Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn. 
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(1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1112-1113.) However, it should be 
noted that defendants here do not claim that their religious 
principles prohibit resort to psychiatric counseling or the 
use of antidepressant drugs, nor do they claim that their 
religious beliefs prohibit a pastoral counselor from 
advising a counselee to seek psychiatric care. On the 
contrary, the record shows that defendants not only 
acquiesced in, but on occasion recommended such treatment. 
Thus, defendants do not contend that a psychiatric 
referral itself violates their religious beliefs. They 
contend, rather, that the imposition of tort law duties in 
general creates an impermissible "burden" on religious 
liberty. Where the interest is sufficient, however, it is 
well settled that government may as readily compel 
religiously prohibited conduct as prohibit religiously 
motivated acts. (See United States v. Lee (1982) 455 U.S. 
252, 261 [court upheld federal law requiring that Amish 
violate the tents of their faith by participating in the 
Social Security system]; Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905) 
197 U.S. 11, 39 [court upheld law requiring the vaccination 
of children despite parental religious objections].) 
Accordingly, courts, including our own, have determined that 
religious groups may be held liable in tort for their 
actions (Molko v. Holy Spirit Assn., supra, 46 Cal.3d 1092), 
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even where they occur in the context of religiously 
motivated counseling. (See, e.g., O'Neil v. Schuckardt 
(Idaho 1986) 733 P.2d 693, 699-700 [church may be held 
liable for invasion of privacy resulting from marital 
counseling]; Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church (Pa. 1975) 
341 A.2d 105, 107 [action for interference with marriage and 
business relations permitted where church ordered "shunning" 
of former member]; Carrieri v. Bush (Wash. 1966) 419 P.2d 
132, 137 [court allowed action for alienation of affections 
where church pastor counseled woman to leave her husband who 
was "full of the devil11],) As the court explained in 
Carrieri: "Good faith and reasonable conduct are the 
necessary touchstones to any qualified [First Amendment] 
privilege that may arise from any invited and religiously 
directed family counseling, assistance, or advice." (419 
P.2d at p. 137.) 
We need not go as far as these courts in 
sanctioning tort recovery for conduct which was religiously 
motivated. The intrusion in this case (i.e., the duty to 
advise a suicidal counselee to seek medical care) is 
religiously neutral. Defendants are not exposed to 
liability for refusing to counsel contrary to their 
religious beliefs or for affirmatively counseling in 
conformity with their beliefs. Thus, the burden on religion 
is relatively minimal. 
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The governmental interest, on the other hand, is 
compelling; society's interest in preserving the life of a 
would-be suicide is as profound as its interest in 
preserving life generally. To this end, society surely may 
require a pastoral counselor who invites and undertakes a 
counseling relationship with an individual in whom he 
recognizes suicidal tendencies, to advise that individual to 
seek competent medical care. 
Thus, I am persuaded, on the facts presented, that 
defendants owed a minimal duty of care to Nally. I am 
equally persuaded, however, that defendants fulfilled their 
duty. 
The facts in this regard are adequately stated in 
the majority opinion and need not be retold here. Although 
defendants were aware of Nally1s suicidal tendencies and 
continued to offer counseling, they were also aware that he 
had been hospitalized as a result of an earlier suicide 
attempt, had seen a psychiatrist while in the hospital and 
been given a strong antidepressant drug. The record shows 
that defendants were not only aware that Nally was under the 
intermittent care of medical doctors, including a 
psychiatrist, but affirmatively advised him on several 
occasions to seek medical care. Moreover, Nally's 
psychiatrist, Dr. Hall, testified that he had examined Nally 
in the hospital and had advised his parents to have him 
19 
committed. Dr. Hall, however, refrained from initiating 
involuntary commitment proceedings. 
Therefore, as the trial court expressly found, the 
evidence shows that defendants neither breached their duty 
to Nally, nor contributed in any causally significant 
respect to his suicide.S/ For these reasons, I conclude 
that the Court of Appeal erred in reversing the judgment of 
nonsuit and dismissal of the action. 
Accordingly, I concur in this court's judgment. 
KAUFMAN, J. 
I CONCUR: 
BROUSSARD, J. 
2/ The absence of breach or proximate cause does not, 
of course, preclude our holding that defendants nevertheless 
owed a minimal duty of care. (See fn. 7, ante, at p. 
[typed opn. at p. 11].) 
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